Monday, May 4, 2009

Week 4

This week we learned about framing and cascading. Both are substantive and procedural. The substantive part is the event itself and the procedural part is "how did we get to this point?" We also learned about salience as that which is most prominent or of the most importance. We then talked about cascading, the process of in which information flows and filters its way from the administration to the public via the elites, opinion leaders, and the media. Then, we took three seemingly unrelated news stories in order to emphasize the danger of defining issues too narrowly, thus isolating individual "necessaries" in an effort to turn them into "sufficients". Too immediately categorize and pigeonhole any story and say its not related to another is dangerous. We also talked about Entman's argument that lots of factors , not just press coverage, weigh in on the minds of decision makers and the public , affecting the outcomes of events.

1. what happens when one story is immediately deemed as irrelevant to another?
2. Is it possible to deem to many stories as being linked or related to each other?

1. When a story is deemed irrelevant immediately, the effects of it on another issue or event are completely and immediately ignored. By pigeonholing stories, decision maker's don't get the chance to consider outcomes that will occur because of the pigeonholed events, leading to an incomplete and ineffective policy or decision.

week 3

In the readings for this week, we discussed framing and the cascade model. We learned that the media's political influences arise from how they respond - from their ability to frame news in ways that favor one side or another. The book advances a model of cascading activation as a way to explain who wins. The standard definition of framing is selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation,and / or solution. We talked about knowledge networks and spreading activation and how first impressions are hard to dislodge. We talked about how cultural congruence measures the ease with which a new frame can cascade through different levels of the framing process and stimulates similar reactions at each step. We also talked about magnitude, or magnifying elements of a depicted reality that favor one side's position, making them salient, while at the same time shrinking those elements that might be used to construct a counter-frame. We concluded that the central goal over all political maneuvering over news frames is simply to generate support or opposition to a political actor or policy. Also, when a single frame thoroughly dominates politically, impressive majorities will come to congruent understandings.

1. Can the way an event is framed backfire, or give unexpected results?
2. Is there any other reason that governments control the way things are frame other than to gain support or opposition for an actor or issue?

1. The framing of an event can backfire if the decision makers in charge of the framing do not take into account who their intended audiences are and who else might possibly view the way they frame something. Emphasizing one element may produce the desired response in the target audience, but if it is viewed by an unintended audience, it may produce serious negative consequences.

Week 16

This week we continued the reading on how and why the US, the UN and the Western media ignored the lead up to the September 11th attacks. A major failure of the National Council on Terrorism was to only designate Afghanistan as a sponsor of terrorism and impose economic sanctions instead of putting policies to prevent and punish terrorism. Both the government and the media viewed terrorism as a nuisance that required little attention. It was a mistake to put only counter terrorism experts in charge of counter terrorism. Counter terrorist tactics will not defeat a movement that is grounded in fanatical ideology. We also talked about how diplomacy that is not backed by a credible threat of the use of force will not work, just as the use of force without a clear diplomatic purpose will fail. The Clinton administrations failure was to develop counterterrorism tactics in Afghanistan without a political strategy. The major point of the book we looked at was that the 9/11 attack was not so much an intelligence or military failure as a strategic foreign policy failure. The lesson proposed by the book for the media is the continuing coverage from all over the world where the US does not have an active policy. It is the conflicts in these faraway places that have created the environments for criminals to flourish. In this way, the media will keep the general public informed and will be able to get the government to act on issues that it would otherwise ignore.

1. If the US government and media followed the course of action outlined in the reading, would 9/11 have happened?
2.

Sunday, May 3, 2009

Week 15

This week we went over the group projects and the press conference. We talked about group communications, and how two people in a group, without trying to be devious, will take initiative beyond the requirement out of altruism because they are frustrated about a policy not moving fast enough or information not being clear enough. This was an example of a lack of communication within the group. Also, any attempt to give out perfect communication or to seek perfection in any aspect will ultimately lead to frustration. Perfection is the enemy of good, because if you try to pursue perfection, you will come up too little or too late. We also looked at the questions that the heads of organizations were trying to answer, like "Who said what to whom? and "which member told this non-member that?" We also deciphered why the press is so relentless in obtaining information; they are trying to get as much information as possible, even though they know the most they could ever get is around 90%. The simulation made the imperfections of the system jump out. We also started talking about the Gutman reading by discussing how after the Soviets left Afghanistan, enthusiasm was limited because there was no desire to start a wider conflict.

1. What would happen if it were possible to have perfect information within the simulation?
2. What would have happened if the US remained interested in Afghanistan after the Soviets left?

It is nearly impossible to tell how the simulation would run if everyone would have perfect information. It may lead to less frustration within groups, but it is unlikely that it would lead to agreement among everyone. Just because two groups know everything, it does not mean that they will agree because they have different interests.

Week 14

This week the entire class presented their projects in a press conference. It was interesting to see how all of the different groups' work came together and maintained relevant to each other. The previous days were hectic as my mailbox was constantly flooded by items coming in over the news wire. Our group spent quite a while putting together our video while maintaining contacts with media outlets and politicians. It was interesting to see how different groups chose to frame different issues and events. The question and answer portions were of particular interest, as some people were caught off guard while others managed to get around the questions successfully. I felt it was a good experience to gain a deeper understanding of the foreign policy process and the relationship between governments, media, and non-state actors.

1. What would have happened if, within each group, moles or rogue actors were secretly assigned?
2. What restraints were there on the simulation?

1. It definitely would have been very interesting if there were moles or rogue actors within the situation. There would have been much more disinformation leading to confusion and miscommunication and ensuing witch hunts to find out where the leaks are coming from. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, it would probably not be able to play out completely and create more trouble than its worth.

Week 13

This week we read about the depictions of the crafty and cunning American spy was embedded into American psyche by television shows during the Cold War. We also read about how times of crisis effect how Americans view their identity. It is interesting to see how early on in the Cold War, television networks put forth programming that supported patriotism and American ideals in order to gain support from the government and avoid persecution form Red Scare witch hunts. What's even more interesting is that with the decline of the Red Scare, these serious spy thrillers became more comedic and parodies of themselves. We saw how an analysis of the evolution of these shows gives us a tool to examine American nationalism and its portrayal in the media. This week we also handed out the role assignments for the simulation. Luckily I don't have to go it alone on the project, as I am part of a popular media group. I'm the head of A&R for NHM Music, but I'm not exactly sure how to frame that in terms of media and foreign policy. Our group met together after class and it looks to be a very interesting project.

1. Where there any other genre of popular media that was influenced by the Cold War?
2. What role does music play in the foreign policy process?


1. Two genres of popular media that were affected by the Cold War are Western films and theater. Two examples of this are the film High Noon and the play The Crucible. The Crucible is about the actual witch hunts in Salem, an almost direct parallel to the McCarthy hearings. High Noon was also influenced by the Cold War because of the main role of the countdown to the arrival of the antagonist, a parallel to the countdown to the end of containment and nuclear destruction.

Week 12

This week in class we discussed the role of popular culture in mass media and art and how it is involved in the foreign policy process. Popular culture has a degree of mass appeal and mass attention and does not occur in a hypodermic process. When looking at pop culture, we cannot toss it by the way side and dismiss it as background noise. We must look at pop culture in terms of certain political functions. The four specific political functions that we use to assess pop culture and its role in politics are its function to define, to socialize, to mobilize, and to transform. We also dispelled the myth that art sparks change by showing that, usually, elements of change influence the art. We also discussed how art rarely alters the way in which someone views society completely. If a piece of pop culture does transform its audience, however, there is a lot of instability as people throw out all their fundamental beliefs and try to redefine themselves. Art doesn't serve as a trans formative vehicle in itself. We also watched the documentary Hollywood Vietnam. This film showed the impact of popular culture and its impact on public opinion. It shows how Hollywood had the benefit of not having to report things as they happened. They could wait a few years in order to derive some meaning from the situation and to find the zeitgeist. Movies did not necessarily depict what the soldiers went through, but they definitely effected the public's perception of Vietnam. The movies were also made to reflect the sentiments for their target audiences. These sentiments may not have been 100% accurate. It's also interesting to note that there are not many films concerning the decision making and politics behind the Vietnam War.

1. How did Hollywood influence the American public's view of the Gulf War?
2. Are there any pieces of art or pop culture that did transform beliefs dramatically?

1. With films such as Jarhead and We Three Kings, the depiction of the Gulf War has helped to form an image in the minds of the general public. The films shaped the public's idea of what war is like and how it negatively influences soldiers.

Week 11

This week we discussed terrorism, its media coverage, and its impact on foreign policy. We looked at what terrorism is, how it is covered, and the images behind terror. We learned that there is no agreed upon definition of terrorism, but how one chooses to frame the threat of terrorism suggests the possible ways to solve it. Most politicians and media have come to a sort of consensus of what terrorism is: "Terrorism is the use of force involving the killing of civilians to advance a political cause. We then discussed how both media and government frame terrorism policy and terrorist attacks by using the same terms as the other one does. The larger packaging of terrorism is the same by both, even though the critique and the impetus may be different. The packaging of terrorism by media or government is also all about power. We also discussed how the media needs to think independently and not become another tool of authority. The fact that the media take their cue from how government officials frame terrorism gives government tremendous power in directing the public debate. The book suggests that we need to rebuild these institutions from the ground up and ask as many questions as we can because we don't have all the answers.

1. How can we go about rebuilding the institutions from the ground up?
2.

Week 9

This week we watched one of the films of the Why We Fight series directed by Frank Capra. Two questions asked before we watched the video are "who was it made for?" and "why?" Even though there was a draft and an attack on Pearl, many members of the military were still confused as to what they were doing overseas and why. This film highlights the role in which newsreel films played om shifting attitudes by tying existing beliefs and values to the threats that America saw at that point in order to shift public opinion from an isolationist stance. Initially these films were meant only for military personnel, but leadership felt it was necessary that the general public view these films as well. Many parts of the film appeal to emotions and idealistic sentiments. there are also scenes from the German propaganda film Triumph of the Will by Leni Riefenstahl.

1. What were the effects of Triumph of the Will in Germany?
2. Where there any films that tried to sway US public opinion in the other way?

1. Triumph of the Will was very popular in Germany. It allowed the German people to believe that Hitler and his cause were just. Although it did not mobilize scores of people to enthusiastically support all of the measures put forth by Hitler (such as the persecution of the Jews), it did encourage many to turn a blind eye to it.

Week 8

This week we talked about digital diplomacy and the introduction of new technology to the process that broadly defines foreign policy. Doing this, we need to keep in mind that the foreign policy process is more than interactions between diplomats, senior policy makers, or states. Foreign policy is a domestic internal process as well as an international one. We also talked about developments in foreign policy and technology that came about after 9/11. These include a more robust domestic wire-tapping program, ease of communications between transnational groups, the increasing visibility of non-state actors, increased information sharing between intelligence agencies and nations, and a preference for speed vs accuracy. the result is greater awareness and a greater sense of immediacy. with more technology, individuals become more selective of where they get their information from by choosing sources that conform to views that they already have. they also tend to go for the more readily available sources. We then talked about domestic attention to international events and dispelled the basic assumption that domestic political concerns are more salient, that people are more aware of them, and that they make a conscious effort to learn more about issues that are seen as directly involving the neighborhood. The reality is that citizens are in fact quite aware of foreign policy issues and they understand the connections between domestic and international issues.

1. What are some instances in which decision maker's underestimated voter's concerns and understandings of foreign policy?
2. Why do members of the public go to sources that conform to their beliefs?

2. Individuals choose to listen to media sources that conform to their beliefs because they feel more comfortable. Just as someone goes to a restaurant that conforms to their taste, people go to a news source that frames events in a way that is agreeable to them.

Friday, May 1, 2009

Book Review: Cyber-Diplomacy

Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century
The book Cyber-Diplomacy talks about the advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs) and its influences in diplomacy. Cyber-Diplomacy is a compilation of essays from professors, an editor of a foreign policy quarterly, a deputy minister of Canadian foreign affairs, and a staff member of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The book uses the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs to illustrate the changes that many governments have needed to make since the advent of the internet in order to remain efficient and effective. Specifically, these alterations include the modification of diplomacy in light of new developments in ICTs, the organization of evolving information and communications systems, and the ability of governments to use new technology in order to further its public image at home and abroad. These advancements in mass communication and information technology bring with them new challenges to the way that diplomacy was conducted in the past. The challenges that the book cites are the reduction of hierarchy in favor of horizontal networking, the reduction of secrecy, the increase of transparency, the increased ability for global movements and non-state actors to become mobilized, and the escalating significance of public diplomacy in foreign affairs. The book makes clear that the primary facilitators and accelerators of change are the improvements in ICTs. These advancements have allowed millions of individuals and non-state actors to become linked to a complex networks with no command center. In conclusion, the book acknowledges that the rapid nature of the evolution of ICTs makes it challenging to predict what effects it will have on culture and diplomacy.
The editor of this book, Evan H. Potter, is the founding editor of Canadian Foreign Policy and was a senior strategist for the Communications Bureau at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Potter worked for the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat while pursuing scholarly work before ending up at DFAIT. While researching at the University of Ottawa and working for the Treasury Board, Potter recognized the need to cultivate research relevant to policies that would link the worlds of politicians and scholars. The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the University of Ottawa supported Potter in his assembly of this book in order to strengthen the participation of non-government actors in the formation and implementation of foreign policy.
The contributors to this book include Andrew F. Cooper, a professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Waterloo; Ronald J. Deibert, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto and director of Citizen Lab; Eytan Gilboa, a professor of communications and government chair of the Department of Social Sciences at the Holon Institute of Technology in Israel; Steven Livingston, the director of the Political Communication Program of the School of Media and Public Affairs at the George Washington University; Gordon Smith, deputy minister of foreign affairs (1993-1997) at DFAIT; Peter J. Smith, a professor at Athabasca University; Elizabeth Smythe, an associate professor at Concordia University College; and Allen Sutherland, a member of the Policy Planning Staff at DFAIT.
The book is useful in that it gathers several viewpoints on the influence of new ICTs on diplomacy from authorities with different backgrounds. By having so many contributors to this book we have the opportunity to see theories on the communications revolution, how new technologies are used to create networks of resistance, the possibilities of real-time diplomacy, the consequences of increasing transparency for diplomacy, and analyses of several cases in which new ICTs were used both effectively and ineffectively.
There are several recurring themes that the different contributors address in their essays. The first is the ability of information technology to bestow enabling power upon its users. This enabling power allows individuals and non-government actors to network and mobilize at unprecedented levels in an effort to level the playing field with governments. The contributors also address the issue of technological determinism by acknowledging that new ICTs are the driving force of change. The key distinction the contributors make is that advances in technology did not create changes, but rather the progression of ICTs created an environment in which these changes could occur.
Another the book deals with is secrecy and exclusivity in diplomacy. The contributors express how new ICTs increase the power of NGOs and how, as a result of increased transparency, governments are encouraged to multiply their connections with the general public. Although this would seem like an inherently positive result, the contributors also recognize the downside to a culture of openness in diplomacy by acknowledging the necessity for secrecy in exchanges of information between governments. The book also demonstrates how the same ICTs that increase the power of individuals can, when used properly, increase the power of governments as well.
The book also challenges the notion that in an age where information is abundant, the need for foreign ministries will disappear. On the contrary, the profusion of information will make the role of the diplomat even more important, as it will be increasingly difficult to ascertain which information is credible. The atmosphere of progressively more diverse information sources will force governments to strive for higher and higher standards of credibility.
In the end, Cyber-Diplomacy is useful in that it provides an analysis of the impact of information and communications technologies by people with a variety of different viewpoints and fields of expertise. It recognizes the inability to correctly predict the future influences of ICTs by entertaining scenarios from both ends of the spectrum, from the rise of unscrupulous individuals who hold governments and societies in the palm of their hand, to the Big-Brother setting in which the government has unchecked powers of control and surveillance. This book is of immediate value in its case studies and possible scenarios for the future, but its downfall is in its correct acknowledgment that the rapid evolution of ICTs makes it difficult to predict their exact influences and the changes they will bring. Because advancements in ICT will arrive faster and faster, it is possible that this book will become outdated sooner than the computer this review was written on. It will be useful in the analysis of its contemporaries, but there is little hope for it remaining relevant in the future.